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Text: Zhang Runchen

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introduction

During World War II, the Japanese army launched the largest war in the history of Asia, in which all Asian countries suffered unimaginable damage. China is one of the hardest hit countries, if not one of them. In addition to China, other Asian countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines and North Korea were also occupied by the Japanese army for a long time.

But as the largest country in Asia after China, India was not occupied by the Japanese army.

(Japanese Army)

1. The best defense is offense

In fact, there is controversy about whether the Japanese occupied India in World War II. Burma was occupied by the Japanese during World War II, and at that time it was part of British India. To some extent, the Japanese army just did not occupy the territory of India in the legal sense of the word, and the Japanese army also tried to attack India, but failed.

In the middle of the War of Resistance Against Japan, that is, during the stalemate of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Japanese army was in a long-term stalemate in China, so it hoped to obtain sufficient resources to break the stalemate by attacking other countries. After the Japanese navy's "southward theory" gained the upper hand, the Japanese army took the initiative to occupy the Indochina colony controlled by the Vichy French regime, and the Pacific War broke out.

In addition to moving directly south to occupy the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaya, the Japanese army also occupied many islands in the Pacific Ocean to the east. These islands became the frontal battlefield of the Japanese and American forces in the Pacific Ocean, and in the eyes of the Japanese at the time, these islands were one of the main barriers for the Japanese army to defend the resources of the south.

(Indian Colonial Army)

But the problem is that it is not enough to protect the United States to the east, but also to the west, the vast British Indian colony. As the second most populous country in the world at that time, Britain could immediately recruit millions of troops in India if it wanted to, and even the tactics of piling up a sea of people were enough to drown the Japanese army on the Indochina Peninsula.

Therefore, the Japanese army must occupy the Burma area, where the terrain is complex and there are many jungles, as long as it can control Burma, then even if the British Indian colonial army sends a million troops, the Japanese army is sure to use the terrain advantage to destroy the British army. The British commander-in-chief was also well aware of this, so after the Japanese occupied Burma, the British army had been planning a counteroffensive against Burma.

Since the Casablanca Conference in 1943, the British army has been preparing for a counteroffensive in Burma, and the original plan of the British army was to launch an amphibious landing operation in Burma. However, because the Normandy landings had already begun at that time, the situation was not very clear, so the British army was forced to postpone the landing on Burma, but the relevant preparations were still ongoing.

(Japanese Army)

And for the Japanese army, Burma was equally important. In the eyes of the Japanese army, the best defense was offense. In 1944, the Japanese tried to stop the British counteroffensive by attacking Imphal, and the Battle of Imphal broke out.

2. Luck doesn't last forever

The 15th, 31st, and 33rd divisions under the 15th Army of the Japanese Army were responsible for the attack, and these three divisions were different from the Japanese troops in China, they were almost fully staffed, and the equipment was also up-to-date, so it can be said that they were completely ready for battle. Among the Japanese troops stationed in Burma, this group of Japanese troops can be regarded as a group with relatively strong combat effectiveness.

When the Japanese invaded Burma before, the British army was almost powerless in the face of the Japanese army, and even needed the Chinese army to rescue them. Therefore, in the eyes of the Japanese commander Mutaguchi Ryoya, this battle was not suspenseful at all, and he only needed three divisions of troops to advance lightly, and he was able to capture Imphal in three weeks.

(Reiya Mutaguchi)

In the eyes of many people in later generations, Mutaguchi Lianya did not pay attention to the logistical supply of the attacking troops at all because of his blind self-confidence. In fact, this is a little bit wronged Mu Taguchi Lianya, Mu Taguchi Lian did seriously consider the supply of the troops, but he thought that since the battle could be won quickly, then the supply problem should be simple.

Therefore, according to the plan, the Japanese army only needed to carry three weeks of supplies. However, because the whole Japanese army was permeated with the idea of underestimating the enemy at that time, until the final operation began, the Japanese army's supplies were only 18% in place. So most of the Japanese soldiers only carried a week's rations and two base ammunition before they set off.

In the eyes of ordinary Japanese soldiers, they only need to take Imphal to have countless steaks and cokes to eat. On March 8, Mutaguchi Renya personally led 100,000 Japanese troops across the river. At that time, Mountbatten, the commander-in-chief of the British army in South Asia, had a high fever due to illness, but he attached great importance to this battle, so he rushed to Imphal to discuss the battle plan with General Slim.

(Mountbatten)

After discussion, the two came to the conclusion that the British army should take the initiative to retreat to the vicinity of Imphal for defense, and cede all the area in front of Imphal to the Japanese army. This had two main implications: firstly, the British army was not strong enough at that time, and concentrating forces in Imphal was conducive to concentrating on defense.

On the other hand, it is also to lure the enemy into the depths and "close the door and beat the dog". As a result, the Japanese army could not rely on the wide Chindun River to fight, and the Japanese army's supplies could only be transported through the jungle if they could not rely on water transportation. The British army also controlled the local air supremacy, so it was able to reduce the combat effectiveness of the Japanese army by bombing the Japanese supply lines.

As expected by the Japanese, after the 15th Army crossed the Chindun River, its progress could be described as unusually smooth, with almost no resistance from the British. Under the influence of this victory, the Japanese army became more and more arrogant, but they never realized that the British army was deliberately tempting them to go deep into India.

(General Slim)

Twenty days after the offensive began, the 33rd Division had reached the Bisimpur area, 20 kilometers away from Imphal, and the 15th and 31st Divisions were also closing in on Imphal, and the three sides had also encircled the Imphal area in three directions. At this time, the Berair Highway was between the Japanese and Imphal, and the British placed three brigades of troops here.

In addition, the British army also built a series of fortifications in front of the road for defense, and all the commanding heights around it were occupied by the British army. In short, the Japanese attack on the Belair road did not have any obvious firepower superiority. After arriving here, the Japanese began to attack the British positions on the Bellaire Highway several times in succession.

However, the actual effect was very poor, and because it was a long time since the start of the offensive, the supplies that the Japanese carried with them were almost exhausted. The daily ration of the Japanese soldiers dropped from 6 taels at the time of departure to 0.3 taels, and a large number of Japanese soldiers lost their combat ability due to hunger.

And because the British troops retreated along the way, the Japanese received almost no booty. But the British troops on the other side were very different, they were not only well supplied, but even able to get luxury goods such as cigarettes. With the arrival of the rainy season in Imphal, it became increasingly difficult to maintain supply routes, and Mutaguchi had no choice but to change his tactics and make a detour north...

(Japanese Army)

3. Rainy season

When the rainy season began, the Japanese began to push their way on the muddy roads, and by this time they could barely eat for a day. However, under the supervision of the officers, they still had to carry out forced marches on a daily basis, and non-combat attrition became more and more serious. But the Japanese army miraculously succeeded in completing a detour and came to the city of Imphal.

At this time, the Japanese army was already stationed in the streets of Imphal. Of course, Mountbatten also found traces of the Japanese army, but he did not plan to let the British army fight the Japanese army in the rainforest, but asked the British army to build a ring of fortifications around Imphal to wait for the Japanese to take the initiative to attack.

But what is even more ironic is that at this time, the Japanese army did not have the ability to attack Imphal at all, and the British and Japanese sides were frozen for a while. Faced with this situation, a Japanese officer wrote in a report to Mutaguchi Ryoya: "With our current strength, if we want to take the position of Imphal, we must undoubtedly hit the concrete wall with our head!"

(Burmese Japanese Army)

And it seems that even God was not on the side of the Japanese army, and in 1944 Imphal was hit by a severe flood that washed away the Japanese garrison and cut off the Japanese army's supply lines. A large number of Japanese troops could only cower on the high ground, and then fell ill in the rain, slowly waiting for death.

During this period, about 30,000 Japanese soldiers were infected with malaria and dysentery, as well as injuries, cholera, and other diseases. In this way, the Japanese army held out for another week, and finally the commander of the 31st Division, Sato, led his soldiers to retreat without the consent of Mutaguchi Ryoya.

Mountbatten immediately seized the opportunity and commanded the British troops to successfully cut off the rear of the Japanese army, and the other two Japanese divisions were almost surrounded by the British army. In July 1944, the Tokyo base camp agreed to a complete withdrawal of Japanese troops. But the order from Tokyo came too late, and the original retreat had turned into an unorderly rout.

(Burmese Japanese Army)

In the process of retreating, a large number of Japanese troops fell into the water and were washed away without being stopped by the British army, or they died on the way to retreat due to illness, or even starved to death. But even so, the British continued to use artillery and bombers in the rear to bombard the retreating Japanese troops.

In the end, only 47,000 Japanese troops managed to escape back to Burma, and more than half of them died in India. The 15th Army completely lost its combat effectiveness, but the British did not stop, this is even without an amphibious landing, the British army is enough to deal with the remaining evil Japanese troops.

The war situation in Burma has also entered the stage of strategic counteroffensive, and the Japanese army can no longer enter India. As for the direct reason for the defeat of the Battle of Imphal, it is actually very simple, that is, because of the serious shortage of logistical supplies. And India has also become a nightmare for the Japanese army...

(Indian Army)

Resources

Imphal: The Nightmare of the Japanese Army. [J].War History Hook Shen.2007.

Yu Jiangxin.On the strategic turning point of the Southeast Asian battlefield: The Battle of Imphal[J].Military History, 1995(6):4.

CHEN Yanping,LI Jianming,CHEN Gaofeng.Arrogant Japanese Army Defeated Imphal[J].National Defense Science and Technology, 2004(11):93-95.

Modern Weapons, 1995(4):3.